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RONCO Executives Talk About Deminin 
An Interview with Lawrence Crandall, Stephen Edelmann and A. David Lundberg 
by Margaret Bust!, 
MAIC 
Can you give me a brief history of how RONCO 
got started with demining? 
Stephen Edelmann: We starred working imernation-
ally in 1980. In the late '80s, we won an open com-
petition to assist the U.S. governmem in running a 
humanitarian assistance program in war-affected Af-
ghanistan during the Soviet occupation. Part of that 
program was trainingMghans on the use of mules as 
pack animals so that they could bring supplies over 
the mountain. When that program was done, we sug-
gested to the U.S. Embassy that they try a pilot pro-
gram using mine-detecting dogs and to approach the 
Thai Army, who had a program, to contribute to the 
Afghanistan war effort. That was done, and the Thais 
contributed 14 dogs and trainers. We used the facili-
ties that had been previously used for the mule train-
ing. The program was very successful, and the U.S. 
government asked us ro expand it and establish a mine 
dog training center and to train a cadre of Afghan 
NGOs that, to this day, still continues to successfully 
operate in the form of an NGO we created. We left 
The Afghanistan Mule Tmining Center berame the first mine dog center. RONCO originally imported 
pack mules ftom Missouri and Tenne55ee to help war-torn Afghanistan get supplies over the mountains. 
PhQIO c/o RONCO 
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them with 92 mine-detecting dogs along with a full 
coterie of vehicles and supplies. T his program has 
cominued ro expand and now employs over 4,000. 
This is a prime example of RONCO's philosophy-
to help develop institutional capacity and indigenous 
personnel. From here, we moved to Mozambique 
where we won a contract to clear 2,200 km of road 
that allowed over one million Mozambican refugees 
to return to their homes. We have been involved in 
demining for over 12 years, probably longer than 
anyone in the field. 
Can you tell me some of the challenges in 
setting up a successful demining program? 
Edelmann: They range from logistics to cultural. 
Wherever we go, we are going into a difficult envi-
ronment because it is post conflict and that requires 
innovation on our part. We have no external support 
and have to rely on ourselves to set up facilities, pro-
curement, security and administration. 
Lawrence Crandall: Historically, the challenges have 
changed over time. Initially, for the Mghan program, 
the challenge was to get the U.S. government to agree 
ro fund the first humanitarian demining program be-
cause there were no policy precedents, guidelines or 
experienced personnel in the bureaucracy. The only 
demining the U.S. military had done was for tactical 
and military purposes. Humanitarian activities were 
not to be found. The challenge was trying to resolve 
a very serious issue. There was a multi-billion dollar 
humanitarian program to assist the Mghans, but a lot 
of the people we were training were being killed or 
maimed by mines. We were seeing our investments 
in these people lost. Washington had no sympathy. 
There was no lobby; there were no handbooks that 
showed you how to do it, and a conservative bureau-
cracy was afraid of it. We finally involved a sympa-
thetic senaror from New Hampshire and a Texas con-
gressman, and they successfully lobbied for the pro-
gram. That was done, and the program started. Once 
we got the demining program going in Mghanistan, 
we tried to hand it off to the U.N., and they would 
tegration and the IMAS Contract 
not go anywhere near it. They said, "Oh no, we don't 
do this." Again, it was because of a lack of precedent 
and experienced personnel in this area. We wanted 
to phase out and institutionalize it, so we approached 
various international 
NGOs, and no NGO 
would rouch it. So, we 
ended up running the 
program many years 
longer than we would 
have liked and finally 
handed it over to the 
U.N. Today, we are 
facing different chal-
lenges. Dave is start-
ing a demining pro-
gram in Albania. 
A. David Lundberg: 
and attitudinal changes. For instance, it is typical ro 
hear that Muslims won't work with dogs. That is sim-
ply not true when you get them exposed ro the use 
of dogs. When we went ro Mozambique, we were rold 
The Albania program 
is remotely located on 
the Kosovo-Albanian 
border. There is no in-
frastructure that you 
can plug into. We are 
essentially picking up 
a piece of our Bosnia 
operation and moving 
it to Albania. Finding 
ho•1sing, medical sup-
plies, food, trans-
port-everything you 
need for this type of 
RONCO deminer ready to start his day in the field. 
by a number of 
people that there 
would be no way we 
would get them to 
use dogs because the 
Portuguese use dogs 
as police dogs and 
attack dogs. You just 
have to overcome 
these stereotypes. 
RONCO has been 
able to overcome this 
because we started as 
a development firm. 
We have a history 
working in the devel-
oping world, so we 
know how ro work in 
that environment, 
and we brought our 
expernse to de-
mining. It is, initially, 
the same. You are just 
dealing with a differ-
ent end product. You 
are developing de-
miners, dogs, logis-
tics, people and med-
Pharo c/o Tony Allen/RONCO. 
operation-is part of our concern. We must import 
Bosnian deminers into Albania because there are no 
trained in-country personnel available. Anytime you 
are working in the developing world, it is difficult. 
The biggest challenge we face is building and devel-
oping indigenous capacity. It was easy to do in Ku-
wait, which was a huge operation, and it was easy to 
bring in expats and machinery, do the job and leave. 
Building indigenous capacity to leave behind, that is 
what gets difficult. You have ro affect both training 
ics. 
How do you monitor the success or difficulties 
of your established programs once you have 
left a country? 
Edelmann: With the Afghan program, we sent people 
back periodically for a number of years to monitor 
the dogs and the training. In Rwanda, we were tasked 
with incorporating a mine dog program into the mili-
tary, which is winding down. We will probably use 
• 69. 
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the same tactic there. We will send people back to 
monitor the quality, training, etc. Our approach is 
to wean ourselves from the program as quickly as 
possible consistent with the ability for our counter-
parts to take over. TheMghan program is doing great 
six years after we have left. That is the key: Can you 
go back three, four, five years later and see what is 
operating successfully? We left rhe Afghans with the 
capacity not only to function efficiently and effec-
tively in the field, bur also from a financial standpoint. 
This ability allowed them to approach donors with 
confidence. One of the reasons is that donors can see 
where their money is going from the financial sys-
tem that we helped them set up. In a donor's mind, 
that is a significant point. Werry to establish a com-
petency technically but also efficient administration. 
Which country you are working in and what their 
requirements are also determines what you need to 
do. You may be at one end of the spectrum, like the 
Mghan program where you are setting up everything, 
or the opposite end, like in Namibia where you are 
only doing basic demining. 
Crandall: In Afghanistan, we created an NGO; in 
Rwanda, a government capacity was created. In the 
Balkans, RONCO helped develop three commercial 
companies, and they are operating and bidding on 
projects on their own and, in some cases, becoming 
parr of our competition and sometimes our partners 
as well. 
Edelmann: Our clients, for instance, like the U.S. 
Department of State, determine these tasking. 
Collaboratively, we come up with a program that 
works. In the Balkans, we had to set up three private 
companies because the government, at the time, of-
fered us li ttle choice. The Bosnian-Croat side had no 
working government, rhe Serbs were considered out-
laws and the Muslims, like many others, were in dis-
array-this is what the situation was like in 1996. An 
NGO didn't seem feasible because of impenetrable 
regulations. So, we decided to develop private com-
panies. The situation determines what we do. 
Does RONCO just set up indigenous capacity, or 
do you actively get tasked to remove mines? 
Lundberg: It's a little bit of both. In Rwanda and 
Afghanistan, we were tasked with specific jobs. On 
the Kosovo/Albanian border, we were tasked with 
removing mines from the border and nor to worry 
about building indigenous capacity. In the case of 
Mozambique, we cleared 2,200 km of roads. We 
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ended up going in and training Mozambicans from 
scratch for dog handlers, logistics [and] transporta-
tion, and when we left, we left with that capacity sir-
ring there. We draw on that capacity to assist 
RONCO with other demining operations like using 
the Mozambicans on the Kosovo-Aibanian border. 
We do this at far lower cost than using U.S. techni-
cians. 
Edelmann: Here is another example of how much 
indigenous capacity building contains costs. Because 
there was uncertainty as to clearance rates and pro-
cedures, we were contracted by the DoD to perform 
quality assurance in Guanranamo Bay behind a Ma-
rine Corps demining operation. We brought in our 
Bosnian deminers. Nor only does this keep your in-
digenous capacity working, but also, it is exceedingly 
cost effective. People have said for many years that it 
takes a lor of money to take mines out of the 
ground-not so. In Mozambique, we were able to 
clear 2,200 km of road at 31 cents a square meter; 
the standard is $1.50 (U .S.) a square meter. It is not 
the cost of raking the mine our of the ground; it is 
the clearing of the area that is suspect. If there is an 
explosion in a field and you don't know if there is a 
mine field there or if it is an isolated explosion, you 
have to survey that entire field and clear it. 
Lundberg: In the case of Mozambique, we were there 
for two years, and the initial mobilization costs were 
high because you are starting up a whole operation. 
The longer you are in a place doing this, the cheaper 
it gets. One of our biggest problems is that many of 
our efforts are short efforts-two to three months. 
The costs for mobilizing to do 200,000 sq. m are 
similar to the costs of being there for two years. So, 
if you were to look at our costs for being on the job 
for two months, the costs are pretty high. If you were 
to extend those costs two years, those cost per square 
meter at the end of the day are going to be a lot less. 
If Mozambique had been a two month program, the 
cost would have been three to four dollars per sq. 
meter. 
Are your surveys mostly done for you or do you 
have to go in and do the surveys? 
Edelmann: It's a mixed bag. We get tasked, as in the 
Balkans, with areas that survey work that needs to be 
done. In Rwanda, the surveys had already been done. 
Lundberg: We are very careful about going in behind 
a survey that has been done. It can quickly become 
apparent that a survey may not have relevance. So, 
we always check with what is there. 
Crandall: We are starting a new project in Thailand , 
and the surveys are being done now by other donors. 
At the request of the Thais, our task leader is involved 
in the scope of the work. Our man our there is moni-
toring the surveys on a regular basis, and he knows 
the individual who is heading 
the survey and trusts h im. 
Edelmann: You are putting 
people in jeopardy. You have to 
have confidence in the survey. 
Many of the NGOs believe 
in the integrated approach 
to humanitarian 
demining. Demining, mine 
awareness and victim 
assistance are all aspects 
that should go on 
simultaneously and all be 
incorporated for 
humanitarian demining to 
be successful. How does 
RONCO, which specializes in 
only one aspect, navigate 
this approach? 
Crandall: Integrated develop-
menr, which is what your talk-
ing about, is a concept that has 
been played with in rhe development world for about 
30 to 40 years. It is rather long of tooth. Many of 
the NGOs have taken on this integrated approach as 
a sort of mantra. There are better and more proven 
approaches. Trying to integrate all aspects under one 
organization just can't happen, and, if it does, it is 
under extraordinarily high cost. We found, as an in-
stitution and myself as an individual, that comments 
about integrated mine action are suspect. Traditional 
integrated development practices arose from differ-
ent development experiences than demining in post 
conflict simations. W hile the client rules, we prefer 
to marker simpler, cheaper and demonstrably work-
able solutions. 
Edelmann: It is one of those concepts that sounds 
great. Why don't we just inregrate everything? The 
integration factor becomes the goal, and you lose sight 
of everything that you are trying to get done and ac-
complish-like saving lives. 
Crandall: We are in rhe development business and 
s tarted as a development business. We added 
demining in 1989. Demining is demining, as far as 
we are concerned. We build private sector enterprises, 
and we undertake agriculture and other development 
projects. We see demining as a tool to open the door 
for education, agriculture and other sectors. You are 
looking at people that did it for over 30 thirty years, 
so we are talking from experience. T he people who 
depend on us to make their farm fields and 
schoolyards safe would lose if we tried to integrate. 
Grafting dissimilar elements onto each other, while 
attractive in the abstract, in our experience, isn't the 
best approach in many, if not most, demining situa-
tions. 
Edelmann: Remember, you are looking at a company 
that has been and is involved in a number of devel-
opment programs. 
Crandall: Now, in the terms of demining, you are 
integrating safety, medical, technology, and dogs 
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When tt mine detectillg dog is 
Jh~t deployed. it must initially 
work with the handler to 
whom it bonded in trttinillg. 
Photo do To11y AJ\cn/ RONCO 
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[and] fund ing. If you want ro call that an integrated 
approach to demining, that is what we do. T hat is 
al ready a complex package. 
How did RONCO get into using dogs as their 
primary focus? 
Crandall: RONCO got started with dogs in Afghani-
stan. During the Soviet invasion, to take equipment 
into the country would have meant the Soviet air-
planes would have destroyed it. You needed a tech-
nology that would not draw a lot of notice to what 
you were doing. We knew that the U.S. Army had 
spent a great deal of time working with the T hai army, 
who was working with dogs in demining along the 
Cambodian border. We needed a low cost, efficient 
technology, and dogs were the answer. We contacted 
the Thai army and negotiated to pick up thei r han-
dlers and dogs and flew back to Pakistan in what was 
then a covert operation. 
Lundberg: Dogs a re just one important part of our 
rool kit. We are using fl ail s and other equipment to 
clear vegetation. T here is a perception around rhe 
world rhar RONCO is dogs. T hat is true, bur it is 
only one element ro our operation. Whenever pos-
sible, we also integrate manual deminers and machin-
ery. 
There is a lot of debate regarding dog use vs. 
manual demining. Many people are suspect of 
dog use in demining. 
Crandall: We assume you are referring to productiv-
ity. We don't agree with that. Handicap In ternational 
went into our operation in Afghanistan and rook a 
look at our data on dogs. In the worst case, dogs were 
found to be rwice as effective as manual demining 
alone. In the best case, it was 20-30 times more ef-
fective. We are finding that demining is faster and 
safer using dogs. In some cases, like in Bosnia with 
the plastic mines, rhe metal content is so low that a 
metal detector can't fi nd them, but you can wi th the 
dog because they detect explosive vapors. 
Edelmann: Also, our dogs are trained on trip wi res. 
There are not any other dogs in the world trained on 
trip wires. T he way we train our dogs and handlers is 
unique. It remains the best approach from our per-
spective. Like explosive vapor signatures, tripwi res 
create an acoustical signature that can be detected . 
Lundberg: Invariably, when we hire a new deminer, 
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the dogs may pur them off. After working with us, 
they won't go into a mine field wi thou t a dog. 
Edelmann: How do you demine a reinforced concrete 
bridge or building? Detectors are essentially useless. 
An integrated team of manual deminers and dogs, in 
our experience, is rhe most cost effective, safe and 
speediest method. 
Lundberg: You have ro remember there are RONCO 
dogs and other dogs out there. T he mi ne-detecting 
dog is becoming more popular, and other dog our-
fitters are starting up because o f the success of 
RONCO. We have seen those dogs, and we have been 
called in to retrain those dogs. And that is not to say 
that other companies' dogs are bad. There are some 
good ones, bur there can be a big difference in dogs. 
Can you tell me about the Integrated Mine 
Action Support or the I MAS contract? 
Lundberg: We can talk about I MAS from RONCO's 
point of view, bur we encourage you to talk to the 
Stare D epartment because we want to make it clear 
that we don't represent the U.S. government. T here 
was a perception out there about this contract that, 
to some extent, may still exist. I had a number of 
NGOs sitting at th is conference table to talk about 
the IMAS contract who were rather upset. It was per-
ceived that RONCO suddenly had $250 million, and 
people wanted ro know: Were we going to be shar-
ing any of that money? That was everyone's opening 
remarks. They didn't understand what that contract 
was and is. The IMAS contract is an indefi nite quan-
tity type contract in rhar [the] State Department tells 
RONCO what it wants done via task orders. 
RONCO is not controll ing th is money or [the] iden-
tifi cation of rhe tasks. The Stare D epartment is giv-
ing us our guidance, our tasks and what they want 
us to do. Some of those tasks involve procurement 
of demining equipment only. T here are p robably over 
50 tasks since we started in September 1999. O th er 
tasks involve services we are being asked to provide. 
Right now, we are in Kosovo; we have six demining 
teams primarily picking up cluster bombs. We are 
going into the Kosovo-Aibania border with rwo fully 
equipped teams for rhe next five months. We are go-
ing into Oman to develop a mine detecting dog ca-
pacity, which wi ll be integrated with their dem ining 
programs. We do whatever the State Department d i-
rects us to do. We give them a written response to 
their task order req uest. T hen we sir down and ne-
gotiate about rhe task order. In a few weeks, we are 
usually mobilized ro action. We are putting a study 
team in Lebanon, as we speak, that is going to work 
on rhe efficiency of a mine dog program in Lebanon. 
What is RONCO planning for 2000? 
Lundberg: We are hopeful the World Bank will re-
appear. Not a lor has come out of the World Bank in 
the las t few years. Its fi nancial strength and relative 
in fl uence make it a potential strong partner. The 
World Bank has taken some time off from demining 
bur may be getting back into it, and, if rhar is rhe 
case, we will be bidding for those options. 
Do you use any specialized Personal 
Protective Equipment (PPE)? 
Lundberg: We deal wirh Second Chance, a U.S. firm 
that specializes in this [Personal Protective Equip-
ment] . We have had them design specific RONCO 
designs like the blast collar, which is a little higher 
and deflects the blast. 
C randall: We just introduced into the Balkans a new 
helmer, which is really just a visor. The visor wraps 
around and decreases the need for a helmer, which 
can be very hor. That little bit of a change improves 
a deminers effectiveness by 15 or 20 percent. We are 
always trying to make the dem iners' equipment bet-
ter. 
Is there anything else you would like to 
mention before we dose? 
Lundberg: I would like ro mention that in all the 
years char RONC O has been in demining, we have 
only lose rwo people to accidents. I don't think chat 
you can find anyone who has been doing it chis long 
char can say char. A big factor is the dogs. Safety is a 
major factor with us. We are very careful with rhe 
deminers we hire. They have to forger the cowboy 
attitude and work with RONCO's operating proce-
dures; otherwise, rhey can't work for us. It pays off 
fo r us. We carry extensive insurance on our deminers, 
bur, even so, our rates are low because of our acci-
dent rate. 
Founded in 1974, RONCO Consulting Company 
is an international professional services firm with 
extensive knowledge in a wide range of development 
issues. Along with humanitarian demining, RONCO 
specializes in privatization and private enterprise de-
velopment, agri business and procurement services. In 
1999, RONCO won the open competitive bidding 
for the IMAS contract sponsored by the Humanitar-
ian Demining Programs Office in the Political-Mili-
tary Bureau of rhe Department of State. • 
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R
ONCO Consulting Corporation 
2301 M Street, N.W 
Suite 400 
Washington, D.C. 20037 
Tel: (202) 785-2791 
Fax: (202) 785-2078 
E-mail: roncowash@aol.com 
Stephen Edelmann, Executive Vice President of Op-
erat ions of RONCO Corporation since 1980, has 
been involved in RONCO's agribusiness, environ-
mental, humanitarian assistance and demining opera-
tions in over 40 developing countries. 
E-mail: sedelmann@roncowash.com 
Lawrence C randall, Vice President for l nrernational 
Programs at RONCO, has over 30 years experience 
managing and developing large and politically com-
plex humanitarian programs worldwide. 
E-mail: lcrandall@roncowash.com 
A. David Lundberg, RONCO's Vice President of 
Operations, has addressed humanitarian issues from 
the perspective of an agribusiness manager, third 
world development manager and USAJD Senior Ex-
ecutive. He has worked throughout Africa, the East-
ern Bloc, the former Soviet Union, Asia and Latin 
America. 
E-mail: roncowash@aol.com 
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In gmaal, dogs are fiilly 
effictive at finding ncplosivl's 
I 0 cemimners below the 
surjftce
. Neither 
dogs nor 
detectors can l'asily find mint's 
under 30 centimeters ofhenvy 
clay soil. 
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